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John Vincent’s Reading at Gray’s Inn, 1668/9, on the Merchants’ 
Assurances Act 1601 
 
JEFFREY THOMSON 
 
Abstract 
In Lent Term 1668/9, John Vincent, a bencher of Gray’s Inn, gave a reading on the 
Merchants’ Assurances Act 1601 (43 Eliz. I, c.12). The notes of the law reporter, Joseph 
Keble, record this observance of the centuries-old tradition of readings, which was destined to 
expire within the next two decades. This paper situates Vincent’s reading within the changing 
tradition of readings in the seventeenth century. It highlights the role readings continued to 
play in disseminating sophisticated legal learning, particularly in relation to newer areas of 
practice such as marine insurance, which were largely uninformed by statute, common law 
precedent or reference works, and would have been difficult to master through book-study 
alone. It examines a selection of issues discussed during the reading, focussing on legal 
outcomes grounded in the ‘customs’, usages, practices and understandings of merchants, and 
illustrating how these were perceived as exceptional by comparison to the ordinary rules of 
the common law. The nature and jurisdiction of London’s court of assurances, reconstituted 
and empowered by the 1601 Act, are also discussed. More generally, this paper demonstrates 
the value of post-Restoration readings for historians of English law in the late seventeenth 
century. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
By the second half of the seventeenth century, barristers and students of the common law at 
the inns of court and of chancery in London would have acquired much of their legal learning 
by reading. Printed legal works had become more numerous and accessible than in previous 
periods,
1
 and by around the turn of the seventeenth century had come to be seen as 
authoritative repositories of learning for the legal profession.
2
 Matthew Hale’s advice to 
students of the common law illustrates this emphasis on solitary reading: 
It is necessary for him to observe a Method in his Reading and Study; for, let him 
assure himself, though his Memory be never so good, he shall never be able to carry 
on a distinct serviceable Memory of all, or the greatest part he reads, to the end of 
seven yeares [viz a student’s period of residence in his Inn], nor a much shorter time, 
without helps of Use or Method; …I shall therefore propound that which by some 
experience hath been found to be very usefull in this kinde, which is this: First, it is 
convenient for a Student to spend about two or three years in the diligent reading of 
Littleton, Perkins, Doctor and Student, Fitzherbert’s Natura Brevium, and especially 
my Lord Cokes Commentaries, and possibly his Reports; this will fit him for Exercise, 
                                                 
1
 David J. Ibbetson, ‘Common Lawyers and the Law Before the Civil War’, 8 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies (1988), 142, at 150–151; Richard J. Ross, ‘The Commoning of the Common 
Law: the Renaissance Debate Over Printing English Law, 1520–1640’, 146 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (1998) 323, at 324–325, 391–403, 430–445. See also John P. 
Dawson, The Oracles of the Law, Ann Arbor, 1968, 68–76. 
2
 Ian Williams, ‘“He Creditted More the Printed Booke”: Common Lawyers’ Receptivity to 
Print, c.1550–1640’, 28 Law and History Review (2010), 39, at 47–70. Cf. Dawson, Oracles, 
78. 
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and enable him to improve himself by Conversation and Discourse with others, and 
enable him profitably to attend the Courts of Westminster. …Afterwards it might be fit 
to begin to read the Year-Books; …and so come down in order and succession of time 
to the latter Law, viz. Plowden, Dyer, Cokes Reports the second time, and those other 
Reports lately Printed: As he reades, it is fit to compare Case with Case, and to 
compare the Pleadings of Cases with the Books of Entryes, especially Rastals, which 
is the best…3  
Despite the legal profession’s shift towards print, the spoken word remained important 
at that time for the transmission of legal knowledge. Oral advocacy was the mainstay of the 
barrister’s profession. As Hale indicated, two to three initial years of book study were 
intended to prepare the seventeenth-century law student for participation in the oral tradition 
of the bar: for ‘Exercise’, engaging in ‘Conversation and Discourse’, and attending the central 
courts at Westminster. In this regard, readings continued to constitute a prominent element in 
that oral tradition, in a student’s legal education and in the life of the inns more generally, 
until the cessation of that tradition around 1684.
4
  
                                                 
3
 Henry Rolle, Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et Resolutions des Common Ley, London, 
1668, 8–9. The attribution of this preface to Hale is in Joseph Story, ‘Review of a course of 
legal study respectfully addressed to the students of law in the United States, by David 
Hoffman, Professor of Law in the University of Maryland’, in The Miscellaneous Writings, 
Literary, Critical, Juridical, and Political, of Joseph Story, LL.D., Boston, 1835, 223, at 229. 
4
 J.H. Baker, Readers and Readings in the Inns of Court and Chancery (Selden Society 
Supplementary Series 13), London, 2000, 61, 102–103, 183, 263 and 335, notes the last 
known readings at each of the inns of court: Lincoln's Inn, c.1667–69; Gray's Inn, 1678; Inner 
Temple, 1678; Middle Temple, 1684. On the decline of readings and other learning exercises 
at the inns: Wilfred R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts 1590–
5 
 
 
This article examines the reading given by John Vincent at Gray’s Inn during Lent 
vacation, 1668/9, on the statute 43 Eliz. I, c.12 (the Merchants’ Assurances Act 1601). 
Evidence of Vincent’s Reading survives in the form of contemporaneous notes taken by the 
law reporter, Joseph Keble.
5
 The Reading is worthy of attention: first, as an example of a 
reading from the end-days of the tradition; and second, because of its topic. The Merchants’ 
Assurances Act 1601 was the first English legislation relating to insurance, giving statutory 
authority to a court of commissioners, the court of assurances, to determine insurance 
disputes.
6
 Neither the 1601 Act, nor the Policies of Assurance Act 1662 which amended it,
7
 
provided any substantive insurance law rules. At the time of Vincent’s Reading, and for 
decades thereafter, the substantive English law of insurance was to be found in a handful of 
court judgments and in the ‘customs’, usages, practices and understandings of merchants.8 
                                                                                                                                                        
1640, London, 1972, 131–136; J.H. Baker, ‘Readings in Gray’s Inn, their Decline and 
Disappearance’, in The Legal Profession and the Common Law, London, 1986, 31, at 35–37; 
Baker, Readers and Readings, 7–8; David Ibbetson, ‘Common Law and Ius Commune’ 
(Selden Society Lectures), London, 2001, 21–22; Williams, ‘Receptivity to Print’, 43 n.11. 
5
 Bodleian Library (Bodl.) MS Rawlinson C 824 (‘Keble’s notebook’), accessible in J.H. 
Baker, ed., English Legal Manuscripts, Stages III–IV [Microfiche], L119–L130: the Reading 
is in L125 Bodl. Rawl.C.824, pp.374–401 H-1795-mf 86 (‘Notes’). 
6
 On the background to the 1601 Act, see: David Ibbetson, ‘Law and Custom: Insurance in 
Sixteenth-Century England’, 29 Journal of Legal History (2008), 291, at 305–307; Guido 
Rossi, Insurance in Elizabethan England: The London Code, Cambridge, 2016, 75–88.  
7 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 23. 
8
 J.M. Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes antérieures au XVIIIe siècle, 6 vols., Paris, 
1837, vol.4, 198, 201, concluded that the 1601 and 1662 Acts presupposed the existence of an 
underlying ‘droit commun’, not to be found in legislation: he speculated that, in matters of 
6 
 
Contemporary barristers could draw on very little authoritative, printed material relating to 
the law and practice of merchant affairs, such as insurance. Vincent’s Reading probably 
represented a valuable opportunity to acquire and exchange learning on the topic.
9
 Equally, 
for present-day legal historians, the relative scarcity of known evidence regarding 
seventeenth-century insurance law and practice means that the Notes of Vincent’s Reading—a 
record, by a barrister and law reporter, of the speeches of practising barristers delivered to an 
audience of professionals and students—constitute a particularly valuable source. 
This paper first considers John Vincent himself, his Reading as an example of a latter-
day reading, and his reporter Joseph Keble. It then employs examples from the Reading to 
illustrate how it would have served to disseminate knowledge, which otherwise may have 
been difficult to access, on the topics of insurance law and practice and the court of 
assurances in the seventeenth century. 
 
II. THE READER JOHN VINCENT 
Relatively little is known about John Vincent. He was admitted to Gray's Inn either in 1633/4 
or 1636.
10
 He was called to the bar in 1648, and to the bench in 1668.
11
 His contributions 
                                                                                                                                                        
insurance law, the English must have followed foreign 'usages'. The terms ‘custom’, ‘usage’, 
‘practice’ and ‘law merchant’ are discussed in J.H. Baker, 'Custom and Usage', Halsbury's 
Laws of England, 2012, vol.32, paras.1–2, 5, 50–52, 62–64, 83–85. 
9
 Baker, ‘Readings in Gray’s Inn’, 32, notes that ‘a reader could choose a text which enabled 
him in effect to lecture on the common law’. 
10
 Joseph Foster, The Register of Admissions to Gray’s Inn, 1521–1889, London, 1889, 203 
(entry for 21 Feb. 1633/4 refers to John Vincent, ‘son and heir of Thomas V., late of Wooton, 
Kent, gent’), 211 (entry for 27 May 1636 refers to John Vincent, ‘son of Thomas C., of the 
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during his Reading suggest that he was knowledgeable about the law and practice of merchant 
affairs, including insurance, but the nature of his legal practice is otherwise obscure. 
The Gray's Inn Pension Book notes a decision on 29 October 1668 that Vincent should 
read in the following Lent vacation.
12
 While in the fifteenth century, a barrister could 
probably not become a bencher without reading, by the early sixteenth century benchers were 
elected on condition that they should read in future.
 13
 Some such benchers would avoid ever 
reading.
14
 Indeed, by Vincent’s time, reading had become less important for a barrister’s 
career progression than previously.
15
 For example, whereas in the early sixteenth century it 
was ‘irregular’ for serjeants or king’s counsel to be made without reading,16 in 1623 two 
barristers who had not read were made serjeants.
17
 
There is no evidence, however, that Vincent attempted to avoid his academic duties. 
One special privilege accruing to readers may have provided some inducement to him. A 
                                                                                                                                                        
city of London, gent.’). See also Baker, Readers and Readings, 60; cf. Reginald J. Fletcher, 
The Pension Book of Gray’s Inn (Records of the Honourable Society) 1569–1669, London, 
1901, 458 (entry for 29 Oct. 1668) n.2. 
11
 Fletcher, Pension Book 1569–1669, 457 (entry for 17 April 1668), 458 n.2; Baker, Readers 
and Readings, 60. 
12
 Fletcher, Pension Book 1569–1669, 458. 
13
 Baker, Readers and Readings, 5. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 128, refers to the ‘diminishing professional advantages of 
performing a reading’ in the period he covers; Baker, ‘Readings at Gray’s Inn’, 36. 
16
 Baker, Readers and Readings, 6. 
17
 Ibid., 7. 
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reader was permitted to select a small number of persons to be called to the bar of his inn.
18
 
Vincent employed this right in granting his son Thomas a ‘degree’, by having him called to 
the bar of Gray’s Inn.19 This may have been important to the elder Vincent, as Thomas 
Vincent was apparently reluctant to obey his father’s wish that he should pursue a career at 
the bar. John Vincent’s will, dated 4 May 1669, recites: 
Whereas my sonne Thomas Vincent to whome I intended a greate part of that small 
Estate which I have left in this world, hath without anie cause that I knowe of gone 
away without my consent or his Mothers, soe that I cannot now in prudence leave the 
care of his Mother and my youngest Children unto him, and fearing he is seduced by 
evill companie, soe that sometime (notwithstanding what he hath taken with him) he 
may be reduced to miserie: I would desire his Mother with mee to forgive him thus 
farr as to use all meanes by her selfe and Friends to reclaime him from his badd 
Companions: And if retourne or send some good accompt, where he is, and hath beene 
with in two yeares and give good assurance of his honest deportment and dutifull 
behaviour for the time to come, and betake himselfe to the studdie of the Lawe (he 
having already received a Degree at my Reading[)],Then I intend him my Chambers at 
Grayes Inne now in the possession of Master Price to enter thereupon when his Lease 
expireth, and in the meane time the Rent towards his incouragement which is Twentie 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 6. 
19
 Foster, Register of Admissions, 306. Reginald J. Fletcher, The Pension Book of Gray’s Inn 
(Records of the Honourable Society) 1669–1800, London, 1910, 1 n.1, notes: ‘The Reader 
had at this time the privilege of calling three men to the Bar at his Reading’. Segar (Harl. MS., 
1912) gives the following list for the years 1663–9: ‘27th February, 1668–9, …Thomas 
Vincent’. Ibid., 98 (entry of 25 June 1688), includes a Thomas Vincent amongst those ‘Called 
to be Ancients’ of Gray’s Inn. 
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pounds per Annum, and I doe alsoe intend him upon the condicons aforesaid Twentie 
pounds per Annum more during the continuance of Mr Price his Lease, and after the 
said Terme to Master Price be ended Provided his Mother and my Overseers of this 
my will be satisfied of his good deportment I would still continue and make good his 
Annuitie to him, over and besides the Chambers aforesaid. But if he retourne not in 
Two yeares and give such Accompt and soe deport himselfe as is above expected, then 
I give the said Chambers to my Overseers in trust to sell, and…doe hereby forgive 
pardon and release him of the moneys he hath without my leave taken with him, but 
give him not Annuitie, nor think fit for his sake further to lessen my Estate to his 
Mother and Sisters…20 
The Gray’s Inn Pension Book records John Vincent’s presence at pensions on 19 May 
and 29 June 1669, but not afterwards.
21
 Barbara Vincent, John Vincent’s widow, would be 
granted administration of his estate on 21 October 1669, for want of executors.
22
  He would 
seem to have died in possession of a substantial estate.
23
 
                                                 
20
 The National Archives: Public Record Office PROB 11/331/203.  In this and other quotes, 
original spelling is retained, and contractions or suspensions have been expanded without 
indication. 
21
 Fletcher, Pension Book 1669–1800, 1–3. 
22
 A Barbara Vincent is referred to as ‘widow of John Vincent of Grays Inn’ in a conveyance 
dated 15 Dec. 1698: East Sussex Record Office AMS3197 
<http://www.thekeep.info/collections/getrecord/GB179_AMS3163_9_3197> accessed 21 Feb. 
2017. 
23
 Centre for Metropolitan History, ‘Hearth Tax: Middlesex 1666, St Andrews Holborn (1 of 
2)’ in London Hearth Tax: City of London and Middlesex, 1666, 2011, <http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/london-hearth-tax/london-mddx/1666/st-andrew-holborn-1> accessed 24 Jan. 
10 
 
 
III. VINCENT’S LATTER-DAY READING, AND ITS REPORTER JOSEPH KEBLE 
By the time of Vincent’s Reading, the tradition of readings had existed for at least two 
hundred years.
24
 The ‘classical system’ of readings in the inns of court had been established 
by the middle of the fifteenth century.
25
 Readings were given in the ‘learning’ or ‘grand’ 
vacations during Lent and in the autumn, when the Westminster courts were not sitting.
26
 The 
topic of a reading was generally a statute: until Tudor times, thirteenth-century legislation was 
invariably selected. Later, more modern statutes were admitted.
27
 The intellectual content of a 
reading consisted of the reader’s lectures, accompanied by numerous hypothetical cases 
                                                                                                                                                        
2017, and MarineLives, <http://www.marinelives.org/wiki/MRP:_John_Vincent_will> 
accessed 24 Jan. 2017, indicate that in 1666 Vincent owed tax for a twelve-hearth house in St 
Andrew’s, Holborn, Middlesex.  
24
 Baker, Readers and Readings, 3–4: there is evidence of reading-like exercises going back 
to the fourteenth century. Regarding readings generally, see: Samuel E. Thorne, ed., Readings 
and Moots at the Inns of Court in the Fifteenth Century (Selden Society 71), 2 vols., London, 
1954, vol.1, introduction; Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, ch.6; M.C. Mirow, ‘The Ascent of 
the Readings: Some Evidence from Readings on Wills’, in Jonathan A. Bush and Alain 
Wijffels, eds., Learning the Law: Teaching and Transmission of Law in England, 1150–1900, 
London, 1999, 227; Baker, Readers and Readings, 3–9, 187–190, 227–239. 
25
 Ibid., 4. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Thorne, Readings and Moots, xvii; Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 119–120; Baker, 
‘Readings in Gray’s Inn’, 32; Baker, Readers and Readings, 3; Ibbetson, ‘Common Law and 
Ius Commune’, 22.  
11 
 
 
which were argued before the audience by the reader and by pre-selected, senior attendees. 
Students, barristers, and benchers of the inn would attend, as might judges and serjeants who 
formerly had been members.
28
 
After Vincent's Reading, the practice of readings would survive for around another 
fifteen years.
29
 By his time, second or ‘double’ readings, and the pre-eminence attendant upon 
those who had delivered them, had disappeared.
30
 The lessened importance of reading for a 
seventeenth-century barrister’s career has been alluded to. The prestige of readership within 
the profession had also declined. By 1668, the readers’ tufted gowns had been adopted by 
king’s counsel, whether they had read or not.31 Various factors have been invoked to explain 
the death of the tradition: the cost of entertainment to the reader;
32
 the increasing availability 
of sophisticated, printed legal materials;
33
 the competing demands of legal practice;
34
 the 
introduction of written pleadings in the courts;
35
 and the English civil wars. The last factor, 
notably, sapped the vitality of the tradition. Most directly, the civil wars and interregnum 
interrupted it altogether: there were, for example, no readings at Gray’s Inn between 1643 and 
1660.
36
 It was then difficult to reinstate them after the Restoration. Those next-in-line to read, 
                                                 
28
 Baker, Readers and Readings, 5. 
29
 See n.4 above. 
30
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 128; Baker, Readers and Readings, 4–5, 7 n.35. 
31
 Baker, ‘Readings in Gray’s Inn’, 36; Baker, Readers and Readings, 8 n.43. 
32
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 128–129, 135; Baker, Readers and Readings, 7. 
33
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 124, 132–135; Ibbetson, ‘Common Law and Ius 
Commune’, 22; Williams, ‘Receptivity to Print’, 68 n.123. 
34
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 135. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Baker, ‘Readings in Gray’s Inn’, 35; Baker, Readers and Readings, 7–8, 58. 
12 
 
having avoided the task for so long, were generally loathe to undertake it, partly because they 
considered themselves to be too senior.
37
 Indirectly, the prejudicial effects of the civil war on 
the inns’ membership and finances meant that the inns valued the fines paid by recalcitrant 
readers, to commute their obligation to read, more than the missed readings.
38
 
The growing expense of the readings, and the increased availability and importance of 
printed sources, have also been called upon to explain the diminishing duration of readings 
over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
39
 In the early sixteenth century, 
readings were expected to last over three weeks; by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century they had shrunk to one to two weeks.
40
 Vincent’s Reading is consistent with this 
tendency. Vincent presented only three main ‘divisions’ and a final ‘repetition’ or 
                                                 
37
 Baker, ‘Readings in Gray’s Inn’, 36. The preamble to John Sicklemore’s reading illustrates 
this attitude: ‘...I cannot say it doth not now surprise me & seeing your masters might have 
made a more worthy & able choice out of my Auncients I hoped your masters well knowing 
my Infirmityes would not have forced me hither pro saltum neverthelesse assoone as I 
received your masters commands herein I set aside all excuses of Age Infirmity long 
retirement to Country practice & whatever could pretend to dissability & most cherfully 
submitted my utmost endeavors to your service...’ (Keble’s notebook, 365–366). Sicklemore 
(admitted to Gray’s Inn, 1633; called to the bar, 1640; called to the ‘grand company of 
Ancients’, 1658) was called to the bench in 1664, having agreed ‘to read in his turn’, and was 
granted a ‘voice in Pension’ in 1667. In May 1668 he was directed to read, to be assisted by 
John Vincent. Fletcher, Pension Book 1569–1669, 339, 422, 449, 453, 458. 
38
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 136; Baker, Readers and Readings, 7–8. 
39
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 126; Baker, Readers and Readings, 7, 228. 
40
 Baker, ‘Readings in Gray’s Inn’, 33; Baker, Readers and Readings, 7, 228–229. 
13 
 
 
recapitulation, occupying four days in March 1668/9.
41
 The eleven other latter-day readings in 
Keble’s notebook, dated between 1663 and 1669/70,42 are generally of comparable length. 
Though admittedly a crude measure, the number of pages in the notebook occupied by these 
readings ranges from fourteen to 113, with a mean of around 43.5, as compared with 
Vincent’s twenty-eight pages.43 The number of days occupied by each reading ranged from 
three to six, with an average of around 4.3 days, as compared with Vincent’s four days.44 
In keeping with tradition, the Reading’s titular statute was probably read out at or near 
the commencement of proceedings on the first day: a marginal reference opposite the heading 
                                                 
41
 i.e. Monday 1, Wednesday 3, Friday 5 and Saturday 6
 
March. 
42
 i.e. between Autumn 1663 and Lent 1669/70. 
43
 The readings in Keble's notebook vary in length: Wm. Ellis, fifty-six pages; Hardres, forty-
seven; Wilmot, fifty-two; Flint, fifty-six; Lehunt, thirty-five; Sicklemore, 113 (including a 
few blank pages); Jones, twenty-four; Amhurst, twenty-four; Skipwith, thirty; Lane, fourteen. 
Excluding the outlier, Sicklemore, the mean length of these readings (including Vincent’s) is 
around 36.6 pages. 
44
 In Keble's notebook, Hardres is recorded as presenting four divisions, the fourth being a 
lecture or repetition. Wilmot presented five, the last a repetition. Flint had five or six 
divisions, the last two being a repetition and a lecture. Lehunt presented four, the last a one-
page conceit or opinion. Jones presented four divisions, the first including comments on his 
choice of statute and a lecture: his other divisions are cases and a repetition. Amhurst 
presented four divisions: three argued cases and a repetition. Skipwith presented four 
divisions: three argued cases and a repetition. Lane presented three divisions: two argued 
cases and a short repetition (which Keble notes ‘was only of what had been before’). The 
exceptional reading in Keble’s notebook is Sicklemore’s, comprising a preamble speech 
followed by five substantial divisions. 
14 
 
on the first page of the Notes locates the 1601 Act in an abridgment.
45
 A further marginal note 
refers to the Policies of Assurance Act 1662, which may also have been read out or referred to 
at the beginning of the Reading. 
Thereafter, Vincent’s Reading broke with the classical tradition in various ways. 
Whereas traditionally the first day of a reading began with an introductory ‘preamble’,46 to 
which a pre-designated attendee would respond, Keble records no such exchange in Vincent’s 
case. It may be that Vincent presented a preamble which Keble deemed to contain nothing of 
substance. However, on at least one other occasion Keble took extensive notes of a reader’s 
preamble.
47
 Vincent may thus, at most, have attended briefly to this ornamental aspect of the 
tradition. Following the preamble on the first day, and at the beginning of each subsequent 
division, tradition then indicated that the reader should present a lecture.
48
 Baker, however, 
notes that ‘in later times the cases seem to dominate the exercise’ at the expense of the 
‘expository part of the reading’.49 Vincent’s Reading is consistent with this observation. 
                                                 
45
 Notes, 373. Baker, Readers and Readings, 229, notes that ‘the full texts of statutes rarely 
occur in the manuscripts’. The marginal reference is to ‘Poult Abridgment’. See: Ferdinando 
Pulton, A Kalendar or table, comprehending the effect of all the statutes that have been made 
and put in print,
 
3rd ed., London, 1612, 310v–311r, paras.15–18 (paraphrasing the 1601 Act); 
Ferdinando Pulton, A collection of sundry statutes, frequent in use, London, 1661, 1150 (1601 
Act in full), and the final ‘Kalender’ under heading ‘Merchants, Merchandises’, nos.14–15. 
On Pulton’s abridgments, see John D. Cowley, A Bibliography of Abridgments, Digests, 
Dictionaries and Indexes of English Law to the Year 1800, London, 1932, xxxiv—xxxv. 
46
 Baker, Readers and Readings, 229. 
47
 John Sicklemore’s: see n.37 above. 
48
 Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 121–122; Baker, Readers and Readings, 229–231. 
49
 Ibid., 231. 
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Keble’s Notes suggest that Vincent delivered only one lecture, on the third day of the 
Reading. Given the several other instances in Keble’s notebook where readers’ speeches are 
recorded,
50
 and others where Keble expressly refers to speeches or arguments which he chose 
not to record,
51
 it seems likely that Vincent simply did not lecture on three of the four days of 
his Reading. In this regard, it is also notable that Master Bennet, speaking on the first day 
immediately after Vincent had presented his first case, began with a series of remarks 
intended to serve ‘as præcognita’.52 This tends to suggest that Vincent had delivered no 
introductory lecture himself. 
Vincent may have been encouraged to adopt this course by the short, procedural 
character of the 1601 Act, which may not have lent itself to interesting, expository lectures 
articulated around its provisions. Instead, Vincent focussed on his cases: ‘a series of 
imaginary factual instances, with the reader's legal conclusions on them, intended to show 
how the law applied to a range of particular sets of facts’.53 With the advancing years, the 
typical number of cases per division in readings declined, in parallel with the number of 
                                                 
50
 e.g. Keble’s notebook at: 2 ff. and 50–56 (William Ellis); 97–104 (Hadres); 222–223 
(Thomas Flint); 258 (William Lehunt); 259–275, 277–297, 301–316, 317–332, 365–372 
(John Sicklemore). 
51
 e.g. ibid., at 458 (indicates omission of arguments by Hooker and Lane); 402–403 
(indicates omission of speech by Jones on his choice of statute and on the government of 
Wales before Edw. I). 
52
 Notes, 374. 
53
 Baker, Readers and Readings, 230–231. Vincent’s cases include details such as ship names 
(‘Hopewell’, ‘Marrigold’, ‘Mayflower’, ‘Royal Oak’) and place names, which may have been 
borrowed from contemporary incidents. But instances of any notable similarity to Vincent’s 
cases have not been identified, so it seems plausible that the latter were of his invention. 
16 
 
divisions and the duration of readings. Whereas in the sixteenth century as many as thirty or 
more cases might be presented in a division, on a single day, by the 1660s the normal number 
of cases in a division is thought to have been ten or twelve.
54
 By comparison, Vincent’s 
Reading, and the other Gray’s Inn readings in Keble’s notebook, appear even more extreme. 
The first two divisions of Vincent's Reading, and most of the third, are each devoted to 
arguing one, relatively detailed case.
55
 Most of the other readings in Keble's notebook also 
exhibit a one-case-per-division structure, with few lectures or speeches. Of the ten other 
readings recorded in Keble’s notebook, only one included more than one case per division.56 
Vincent’s reporter merits brief mention, if for no other reason than to assess the 
reliability of his notebook. There can be little doubt that the Notes are Joseph Keble’s.57 Keble 
                                                 
54
 Ibid., 230. See also Prest, Inns of Court 1590–1640, 127–128. 
55
 By the end of the sixteenth century the cases discussed at readings had become ‘more and 
more complex and diverse’, such that in 1594 the judges ordered readers to shorten their cases 
for discussion and to restrict them insofar as possible to the statute being read: Baker, Readers 
and Readings, 230 nn. 43–44. The final day of Vincent’s Reading (Notes, 399–401) was taken 
up by his repetition, during which he touched briefly on some of the opinions he had 
expressed over the course of his divisions and presented a few further, short cases (none of 
which appear to have been argued). On repetitions, see Baker, Readers and Readings, 233–
234. 
56
 Sicklemore’s reading, beginning on 3 Aug. 1668: Keble’s notebook, 259–372. 
Sicklemore’s reading included substantial lectures, multiple cases (long and short), a full 
preamble speech and a lengthy repetition. 
57
 William D. Macray, Catalogi Codicum Manuscriptorum Bibliothecæ Bodleianæ, partis 5, 
fasc.2, Oxford, 1878, col.427; Baker, ‘Readings in Gray’s Inn’, 35. The title page to Keble’s 
notebook, 2, states: ‘Joseph Keble 1670’. The notebook is also peppered with references in 
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was admitted to Gray’s Inn in 1647, and called to the bar in 1653.58 His industry as a note-
taker and reporter is notorious:  
a law writer of considerable note, and of almost incredible industry. Besides several 
folios, &c. published in his lifetime, he left above one hundred and fifty folios and 
quartos in MS. The disease of reporting was so strong upon him, that, although he was 
never known to have a brief, or make a motion, he reported all the cases in the King’s 
Bench court from 1661 to 1710, the period of his death, and all the sermons preached 
at Gray’s Inn chapel, amounting to above four thousand.59  
It thus seems natural for Keble to have been present, taking notes, at Vincent’s Reading 
during the Lent vacation, 1668/9. 
There is reason to believe that the Notes are a relatively complete record of the 
Reading. Keble’s notebook is fairly consistent in structure and presentation, and gives the 
impression of an effort made not to omit any matters of legal significance. With limited 
exceptions, references to legal authorities such as printed reports, year books, and statutes, are 
recorded in the main body of Keble's notes, appearing as if they had been read out in full and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the form ‘6 Keble 241: pl.30’ (Notes, 385): as Keble’s three volumes of reports did not begin 
to appear in print until well after the Reading, such references were almost certainly to his 
manuscript reports. Keble’s reports may have circulated in manuscript, of course, but it seems 
plausible that Keble himself would have cross-referenced his own reports in his own 
notebook. 
58
 Stuart Handley, ‘Keble, Joseph (1632–1710)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(online ed.), Oxford, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15232> accessed 21 
Feb. 2017. 
59
 Alexander Chalmers, A History of the Colleges, Halls and Public Buildings, attached to the 
University of Oxford, including the Lives of the Founders, Oxford, 1810, 187–188. 
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written down contemporaneously. As has been mentioned, where Keble did not record certain 
matters in detail, he seems to have taken care to note the omissions.
60
 While Keble enjoyed a 
mixed reputation as a law reporter, it has been commented that this may be ‘worse fame than 
he deserves’.61 He has been described as a ‘tolerable historian of the law’, and ‘though very 
far from being accurate, a pretty good register’ of the cases he noted, with details sometimes 
appearing in Keble’s reports that do not in others.62 
      
IV. VINCENT’S TOPIC: INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY 
Knowledge of the law and practice of insurance may have been comparatively difficult to 
acquire for common law practitioners in the 1660s. Common law authority on the topic seems 
to have been thin. Only three English cases relating to insurance were cited during the 
Reading, and most of the authorities cited therein do not relate to merchant affairs at all. 
Printed English works dealing with insurance were few, and such as there were afforded only 
limited assistance. The works cited in the Reading reflect this. Malynes' Lex Mercatoria 
contained a few chapters on insurance, which seems to have represented the best printed 
resource available at the time. However, that work was written from the perspective of a 
merchant, not a lawyer, and was never a proper legal reference.
63
 Amongst works intended for 
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 n.51, above. 
61
 John William Wallace, The Reporters, Arranged and Characterized: with Incidental 
Remarks Upon Their Respective Merits, 4th ed., Boston, 1882, 316. 
62
 Ibid., 315, 317. 
63
 Gerard Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, or The Antient Law-Merchant, 2nd 
printing, London, 1629. Other merchant works of the period were overly practical in focus or 
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lawyers, West's Simboleography contained only a couple of precedent insurance policy 
wordings.
64
 In a short paragraph, Sheppard’s Epitome of all the Common & Statute Laws 
included but a broad definition of an insurance contract, and a brief reference to the registrar 
and court of assurances in London.
65
 Beyond English sources, only Straccha, a sixteenth-
century continental jurist who wrote about insurance, is cited by name in the Reading.
66
  
The first printed English work deliberately addressing insurance from a legal 
perspective, in a manner intended to be relatively comprehensive, was Molloy's De Jure 
                                                                                                                                                        
too brief to have been useful to lawyers, e.g.: Edward Misselden, Free Trade. Or, the Meanes 
to Make Trade Flourish, 2nd ed., London, 1622, 123–124; J.P., The Merchant’s Dayly 
Companion, London, 1684, 349–357. 
64
 William West, The First Part of Simboleography. Which May be Termed the Art, or 
Description, of Instruments and Presidents, 2nd ed., London, 1615, sections 663–664. 
65
 Master Bennet referred to ‘Sheapherd’ (Notes, p 374), by which he probably meant William 
Sheppard, An Epitome of all the Common & Statute Laws of this Nation, London, 1656, 
ch.108 (entitled ‘Of Merchant and Merchandises, Trading and Traffique’), 718–719. 
Sheppard’s entry, which may have been partially based on Malynes, refers provocatively to 
insurance contracts prepared at the Office of Assurances in London being recorded in ‘a 
Charter-party’: even in the seventeenth century, this term normally designated a species of 
contract of affreightment; e.g. West, Simboleography, sections 655–656; Malynes, Lex 
Mercatoria, 7, and part 1 ch.21; Charles Molloy, De Jure Maritimo et Navali: or, a Treatise 
of Affaires Maritime, and of Commerce, London, 1676, 218 para.III. 
66
 Benvenuto Straccha, Tractatus de mercatura, sev mercatore, Lyon, 1556 (reprinted many 
times, e.g. Amsterdam, 1669); Benvenuto Straccha, Tractatus Duo…De Assecurationibus; et 
Proxenetis atque Proxeneticis, Amsterdam, 1658. One participant may also have referred to 
Grotius: see n.77 below. 
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Maritimo et Navali, which appeared in 1676.
67
 It would represent an incremental 
improvement on previous works, and notably suggests that a somewhat wider range of 
continental sources on insurance were available to common lawyers in the later seventeenth 
century. Grotius, Loccenius, Santerna, Rittershausen, Stypmannus and Cleirac, and Antwerp’s 
insurance ordinances of 1563, amongst other sources, are referred to by Molloy.
68
 But if such 
materials were available to the barrister-participants in Vincent’s Reading in 1669, no 
reference was made thereto. Accordingly, the English bar may have been largely unaware of 
such foreign learning on insurance, until Molloy, through his industry, gave it greater 
prominence.
69
 More complete, specialist works on English insurance law would await the late 
                                                 
67
 Stuart Handley, ‘Molloy, Charles (1645/6–1690)’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(online ed.), Oxford, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/18914> accessed 31 
Jan. 2017, notes: on 7 Aug. 1667, at the request of reader Thomas Powys, Molloy was 
admitted to Lincoln’s Inn; on 28 June 1669, he was admitted to Gray’s Inn; and ‘[t]here is 
some evidence that he was called to the bar on 31 July 1669 at the request of the reader of the 
inn’. Fletcher, Pension Book 1669–1800, 2 (entry for 29 June 1669), regarding a pension at 
which John Vincent was present: ‘Ordered that Mr. Molloy bee admitted of this Society 
paying halfe fees and bee allowed his time shewing his admittance in Lincolnes Inne’; ibid. 
n.1: ‘According to Segar (Harl. MS., 1912) the summer Reader (E. Jones) called to the Bar on 
31st  July, …Charles Molloy…’ 
68
 Molloy, De Jure Maritimo, A8v (preface), book 2, ch.7. 
69
 Ibid., A7r (preface), Molloy explains his reasons for writing his ‘Tract’: ‘though I believe 
many have wish’t that such a thing might be, yet none that I can find have ever yet attempted 
the same’. Handley, ‘Molloy, Charles’, notes that De Jure Maritimo ‘was a popular work 
because it catered for the needs of lawyers, and went through many editions’. 
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eighteenth century.
70
 Vincent's Reading may thus have been a truly useful opportunity for 
those assembled to share their knowledge regarding the court of assurances and the law and 
practice of insurance.
71
 
In order to convey some sense of the substantive content of the Reading, this article 
now examines a selection of the issues which were discussed and debated. As will be seen, 
the arguments on many of these issues turned on the identification of relevant merchant 
‘customs’. It may be wrong to infer from the nature of the arguments deployed per se that 
common lawyers of the time were unaware of merchant practices. At least some participants 
in the Reading would have been expected to challenge Vincent’s conclusions on his cases, so 
as to ‘initiate the debate’,72 and in defending particular positions it may have been convenient 
                                                 
70
 e.g. Nicolas Magens, An Essay on Insurances, explaining the Nature of the various Kinds of 
Insurance practiced by the different Commercial States of Europe, and shewing their 
Consistency or Inconsistency with Equity and the Public Good, 2 vols., London, 1755; John 
Weskett, A Complete Digest of the Theory, Laws, and Practice of Insurance, London, 1781; 
and James Allan Park, A System of the Law of Marine Insurances, With Three Chapters on 
Bottomry; on Insurance on Lives; and on Insurances Against Fire, London, 1787. 
71
 In fact, Vincent’s cases ranged at times well beyond the topic of insurance law. Vincent’s 
second division, for example, also dealt with competing claims to a term of years by a lessor’s 
executor, his creditors and the former members of a dissolved corporate lessee. 
72
 Baker, Readers and Readings, 2000, 232. See also Edward Waterhouse, Fortescue 
illustratus, or, A commentary on that nervous treatise, De laudibus legum Angliæ, written by 
Sir John Fortescue, Knight, London, 1663, 544–545 (excerpt from a report to Hen. VIII ‘of 
the Corporation and Election, and of Exercises of Learning’ in the inns of court, by Tho. 
Denton, Nic. Bacon and Robert Cary): cited in W.C. Richardson, A History of the Inns of 
Court, Baton Rouge, LA, [1978?], 101–102. 
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to adopt ‘ordinary’ common law arguments if relevant merchant practices were unhelpful. 
The arguments examined highlight how different the outcome of an issue might be, depending 
on whether a traditional common law position were adopted or whether account were taken of 
merchant practices. 
 
 
1. Insurance ‘with blanke’ 
Vincent’s first case provoked a debate concerning the validity of a policy of insurance on ship 
and goods, ‘by way of Bargain & Sale with blanke’. Such terminology now seems obscure. 
‘Bargain & Sale’ suggests that the value of the insured property would be agreed and fixed at 
the time the policy was concluded, and would not subsequently be adjusted: 
‘…this…policy…being with Blanke is by way of Bargain & Sale & not on account in which 
Case the usage is to answer for that value that is subscribed whatever the losse be…’73 ‘With 
blanke’ apparently meant that the names of the persons for whose use and benefit, or on 
whose account the insurance was made, were not specified.
74
  
The policy in the first case covered a ship and its cargo for a voyage from Alicante to 
London. It was arranged by a merchant’s factor, at Alicante,75 on behalf of the merchant-
owner of the vessel and cargo in London. Before the policy was subscribed by the insurers, 
and unbeknownst to the factor, the merchant sold his interest in the ship. During the voyage, 
the ship was damaged and part of the cargo was jettisoned. The question which arose was 
                                                 
73
 Notes, 380 (Ellis). Accordingly, the extent of the assured’s interest did not need to be 
examined, in assessing the indemnity due. 
74
 Park, A System, 17. 
75
 Notes, 375 (Bennet). 
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whether the ‘with blanke’ insurance was effective to cover the party newly interested in the 
insured vessel, the vendee. 
Several points were argued against the validity of the insurance. It was submitted that 
the vendee was not a party to the policy, and that the merchant’s factor could have had no 
authority to insure for the vendee, that the merchant could not claim in respect of the ship in 
which he no longer had an interest, and that there had been a failure of consideration.
76
 
Raymond went further, attacking the practice of insuring ‘in blank’ directly by arguing that 
there could have been no sufficient agreement between factor and underwriters:  
its void in respect of the thing contracted for what ever as in the other case the 
Custome be that cannot be taken notice of here being matter of fact yet here is not 
actus Contra actum nullus erit contractus evertendi pericula [an act against an act, a 
contract for securing against risk shall be null and void
77
] unlesse there be reciprocall 
knowledge of the thing contracted for…78 
                                                 
76
 i.e. because the merchant had sent no ship, in which he had an interest, on the insured 
voyage: ibid., 376–378 (Raymond), 375 (Bennet) and 381 (Ellis). Ellis considered the policy 
void in respect of the cargo also, arguing that the insurance was one, entire contract. Cf. ibid., 
379 (Weston).  
77
 The first part of the Latin phrase may be from Wiseman v Cole (1585) 2 Co. Rep. 15a, or 
Co. Litt. 47b, cited in David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, 
Oxford, 2001, 141 n.63, and in Peter Benson, ‘The Idea of Consideration’, 61 University of 
Toronto Law Journal (2011), 241, at 272 n.71. The second part may originate from Hugo 
Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, book 2, ch.12, section 23, cited in John Duer, The Law and 
Practice of Marine Insurance, 2 vols., New York, 1846, vol.2, 384 n.(a); translation adapted 
from Stephen C. Deff, ed., Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace, Cambridge, 213. 
78
 Notes, 377.  
24 
 
But the validity of the insurance was defended by reference to merchant-specific rules, 
reflecting the realities of long-distance commerce in the late seventeenth century. Weston 
opined that the merchant’s factor retained authority to insure for whoever was interested, 
despite the sale, drawing an analogy with the authority of shipmasters to borrow on bottomry: 
…in Case of factor is as Incident to act for the master to Judge of times of sale of fit 
ports & means to bring the adventure safe & this being for his masters benefit the 
factor having no notice of the sale so his autority remains unrepealed…thus the master 
may pawn the ship for tackle &c which binds the interest notwithstanding sale by the 
master until notice
79
 
Masters agreed, noting that a merchant’s factor needed to be able to insure ‘without much 
scruple’,80 that is, without specifying the identities of interested parties located far away, 
overseas. Sufficient contractual certainty was achieved by identifying the ship: ‘the 
assurans…is of the ship & whither it were the ship of [the merchant] or not there is 
convenient certainty of the thing…’81  
The only other requirement for the policy ‘with blanke’ to be valid was the absence of 
fraud. As, in the present case, ‘no collusion or inconvenience appears’, Masters concluded: 
                                                 
79
 Ibid., 379. See Scarreborrow v Lyrius (c.1624–28) Noy 95 pl.399, Scarborough v Justus 
Lyrus Latch 252, KB, holding it ‘a good and necessary custome’ for a factor or master to have 
authority to pawn a ship on bottomry for the vessel’s necessities, binding the shipowner. 
Weston also advanced an analogy with the authority of sheriffs: see Charles Viner, A General 
Abridgment of Law and Equity, 23 vols., Aldershot, 1744, vol.19, 451 section (B.a.) no.3: a 
sheriff’s acts were good in law ‘till he has received his Discharge, or has perfect Notice of the 
new Sheriff’. 
80
 Notes, 375–376. 
81
 Ibid., 376. 
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‘this being the Common practice is good in regard the merchant can be but in one place…’82 
Vincent took up this point in his repetition, on the final day of the Reading: the policy ‘with a 
blanke’ was valid ‘because there can be no fraud intended therfore albeit the Contract be 
Intire yet the assurors stand in the place of the assured…’83  
 
2.  Enforcement of the policy by third parties 
Vincent’s second case raised an issue concerning the enforcement of a policy of marine 
insurance by third parties. In that case, a merchant insured his ship and cargo for a voyage to 
New England and back. He declared in the policy that it was made for the purpose of securing 
his creditors, in the event that he died during the voyage. The merchant did, in fact, die during 
the voyage, and the ship and cargo were lost. Vincent concluded that, by virtue of the 
declaration in the policy, the merchant’s creditors could claim thereunder. 
Holt
84
 disagreed. He argued that, under the 1601 Act, the commissioners of the court 
of assurances had no discretion to apply rules inconsistent with the common law.
85
 At 
common law, a policy of insurance had to be supported by mutual consideration: here, no 
consideration had moved from the merchant’s creditors, and it was not sufficient that the 
                                                 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Ibid., 399. 
84
 This was not John Holt, the future chief justice. It may have been his father, Thomas Holt 
(admitted 1634; call to the Bar, 1648; ancient, 1662; bencher, 1671; elected reader, 1674): 
Foster, Register of Admissions, 204; Fletcher, Pension Book 1569–1669, 368, 444; Fletcher, 
Pension Book 1669–1800, 14, 33. 
85
 Notes, 385. 
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indemnity would benefit them as such. As authority, Holt cited Bourn v Mason.
86
 He also 
referred to the jurist Straccha, who had classified insurance as a civil law innominate contract, 
under which the insurer offered the performance of bearing the risk in exchange for the 
premium.
87
 Further, he argued, the declaration in the policy, for the benefit of the creditors, 
‘coming after a perfect assurans made’, was ‘repugnant’ and thus ‘void’: just as in the case of 
a conditional obligation to pay £100 unless £50 were paid by a certain date, a further 
declaration at the end of the bond requiring payment of a further £20 would be void.
88
 
                                                 
86
 Bourn v Mason and Robinson (1667–68) 2 Keb 454, 457, 527, KB. The need for quid pro 
quo between the parties, in the sixteenth century, is discussed in J.H. Baker, ‘Origins of the 
“doctrine” of consideration 1535–1585’, in Collected Papers on English Legal History, 3 
vols., Oxford, 2013, vol.3, 1190–92, 1197. Cf. esp. J.H. Baker, ‘Privity of contract in the 
common law before 1680’, ibid., 1204, 1209–23: in the mid-seventeenth century, if a debtor 
contracted for another's promise to pay his creditor—as the merchant in Vincent's case did, 
contracting with underwriters to pay his creditors—, the creditor-beneficiary could bring 
assumpsit against the promisor; Bourn v Mason appears inconsistent with other seventeenth-
century authorities in this regard. See also Vernon V. Palmer, ‘The History of Privity—The 
Formative Period (1500–1680)’, 33 American Journal of Legal History (1989), 3, 38–45. 
87
 See n.66 above, and discussion in J.P. van Niekerk, The Development of the Principles of 
Insurance Law in the Netherlands from 1500 to 1800, Kenwyn, 1998, 182–188. It has been 
doubted whether civilian treatises on insurance reflected actual merchant practice: Rossi, The 
London Code, 4–5. 
88
 Notes, 386. See William Sheppard, The Touch-Stone of Common Assurances, London, 
1651, 88: where there are ‘two causes or parts of [a] deed repugnant the one to the other, the 
first part shall be received and the latter rejected…’ 
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Ayloffe also contended that the creditors could have no benefit under the policy: they 
were not concerned with the policy or the adventure, had advanced nothing to the insurers, 
and had not requested that it be made. Moreover, the declaration in their favour was not ‘any 
Essentiall part of the Policy’, and should not cause them to be preferred in the distribution of 
the merchant’s estate to other creditors, some of whom, if claiming under statutes or 
judgments, would normally enjoy priority.
89
 
But such arguments ignored the obvious utility to merchants of being able to insure 
effectively for the benefit of third parties. Vincent emphasized that it was ‘part of the Policy’ 
that if the merchant died payment was intended to be made ‘to any persons assigned’.90 
Skipwith suggested that the creditors’ rights might be effective in equity, perhaps as a 
declaration of trust, or in the alternative as the declaration of a legacy.
91
 And Tourner appears 
to have argued that, if necessary, special rules should apply to merchants here, as they did in 
other matters: ‘the law of merchants is parcell of ours & merchants may assign debts which 
others Cannot do…[and] that master may pawn a ship is by that law also’.92 
 
3. Policies ‘on account’ 
In his lecture on the third day of the Reading, Vincent addressed the question of policies ‘on 
account’. The expression and practice of insuring ‘on account’ appear to have fallen into 
disuse since the seventeenth century. Vincent described ‘on account’ policies as ‘the 
                                                 
89
 Notes, 389. 
90
 Ibid., 390. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Ibid., 386, citing 1 Inst. 11 (where Coke notes, under the title ‘In law’, no.12, that the 
‘divers lawes within the realme of England’ include ‘Lex mercatoria, merchant, &c.’), 
Scarborough v Justus Lyrus (n.79 above), and Bridgeman’s Case (1614) Hob. 11, CP. 
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auncientest & most beneficiall way of assurans for the assurors’.93 As he explained, the 
liability of the various underwriters attached chronologically in order of their subscriptions: 
‘the partyes must make out what the Goodes Cost at first’ (i.e. their prime cost),94 and if it 
emerged that there had been over-insurance, ‘they who first subscribe answer the whole & the 
latter is discharged’. 
Instances of over- (or under-) insurance being identified retrospectively were probably 
not rare. A policy would often be made at a place far distant from that where the insured 
cargo had been or would be acquired, and the nature and value of the cargo to be insured 
might not be known.
95
 Each underwriter subscribing the policy was treated as concluding a 
separate contract with the assured. In the event of over-subscription—where the cargo 
shipped on the assured’s behalf was of less value than the total amount subscribed—the 
insurers subscribing last-in-time were released from their contract, because they had run no 
risk. In such cases, the last-subscribing insurers would thus be relieved from liability for 
claims.
96
  
At the time of Vincent’s lecture, written material regarding ‘on account’ policies 
existed, though it differed from Vincent’s presentation in some respects.  The manuscript 
London insurance code of the 1580s contained provisions suggestive of ‘on account’ 
                                                 
93
 Notes, 393. 
94
 See also Vincent in arguing his third case (ibid., p 398): ‘…this being a policy on account 
& not as in the former Cases by Bargain & Sale the persons ensured must strictly shew what 
the Goodes Cost…’ 
95
 e.g. Bayning v Holder (1602–03) PRO C 2/Eliz/B22/48: the policy was underwritten in 
London in around 1580, in the amount of around £1533; the cargo was apparently acquired 
and shipped later, at Lisbon, and had a value of around £1645. 
96
 See discussion in Rossi, The London Code, 246–248. 
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insurance, though the expression as such was not employed.
97
 However, there is no mention 
of the London code in the Reading.
98
 Malynes did not employ the expression ‘on account’ 
either, but he recorded the practice of releasing the last-in-time underwriters in the event of 
over-insurance on a homeward voyage, describing this as ‘the Custome’: 
To this purpose doth appertaine another propertie of Assurances, which happeneth, 
when Merchants cause a greater summe to be assured than the goods are worth or 
amount unto when they are laden into any ship which is expected home wards, making 
account that their Factors will send them greater returnes than they do: in this case the 
Custome is, that those Assurors that have last subscribed to the policie of Assurance, 
beare not any adventure at all, and must make restitution of the Premium by them 
received, abating one halfe in the hundreth for their subscription…and this is duely 
observed; and so a Law not observed is inferior to a Custome well observed.
99
  
The ‘Law’ referred to by Malynes was the Roman civil law, under which, he suggested, 
underwriters were proportionate liable in the event of over-insurance:  
                                                 
97
 Ibid., 200, 530–532. 
98
 Nor is the London code mentioned in Malynes’ Lex Mercatoria, as noted in J.S. Kepler, 
‘The Operating Potential of London Marine Insurance in the 1570’s: Some evidence from “A 
Booke of Orders of Assurances within the Royall Exchange”’, 17 Business History (1975), 
44, at 48. Guido Rossi, ‘The Booke of Orders of Assurances: a Civil law code in 16th century 
London’, 19 Maastrict Journal of European and Comparative Law (2012), 240, at 249–252, 
notes that the London code was confirmed by the Council, but probably only served as a 
guideline, to be departed from if merchant practice had diverged over time. Otherwise, it is 
not known how or for how long the London code was employed. 
99
 Malynes, Lex Mercatoria, 156; see also 161. 
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…if part of the goods were laden, then the Assurors are liable for so much as that part 
of goods did cost or amount unto: albeit that in this (as I have touched before) custome 
is preferred above law; for the civile law (if there be many Assurors in a ship upon the 
goods laden therein) maketh all the Assurors liable pro rata, as they have assured 
according to the said part of goods laden, if a losse do happen: or if there be cause to 
restore the Premio or sallarie of assurance in part. But the custome of Assurances doth 
impose the later underwriters of the Assurors do not beare any part of the losse, but 
must make restitution of the Premio, and reserve onely one halfe upon the hundredth 
pounds, or 10ß for their underwriting in the policie of Assurance, as is observed. The 
Civilians therefore have noted, That in Assurances the customes of the sealawes, and 
use amongst Merchants is chiefely to be regarded and observed.
100
 
A seventeenth-century common lawyer, reading Malynes, might have been forgiven 
for questioning which solution to adopt, the merchant usage or the civil law rule. Adding to 
the potential confusion, in other instances, Malynes explained that underwriters should 
contribute to indemnities payable under policies pro rata according to the amount they had 
respectively subscribed.
101
 Neither the policy wordings, nor other contextual factors, would 
have indicated that a different approach should apply to cases of over-insurance.
102
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 Ibid., 166. 
101
 Ibid., 147, 154. 
102
 Molloy, De Jure Maritimo, 243, recorded both the ‘civil law’ pro rata liability rule and the 
‘customary’ chronological rule, without indicating which represented the position in English 
law. Citing Grotius, Molloy states: ‘If a man Ensures 5000l. worth of Goods, and he hath but 
2000l. remitted, now he having ensured the real Adventure, by the Law Maritime all the 
Assurors must answer pro rata’. Molloy then continues: ‘But by the opinion of some, onely 
those first Subscribers who underwrit so much as the real Adventure amounted to, are to be 
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Vincent and his contemporaries would have been aware of the two competing 
approaches on this issue.
103
 Vincent’s contribution is notable as an instance where common 
law barristers adopted the merchant practice as representing the common law.
104
 Still later in 
the seventeenth century, one reported case would confirm Vincent’s view, suggesting that in 
the absence of wording to the contrary in the policy (e.g. an expressly agreed ‘value 
certain’,105 or an agreed ‘value blank’ to be filled in after subscription106), the ‘custom’ was 
                                                                                                                                                        
made lyable, and the rest remitting their Premio…are to be discharged’; adding in the margin: 
‘And indeed is more the Custome of Merchants then Law’. But in his Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid, Haarlem, 1631, trans. as The Introduction to Dutch 
Jurisprudence, of Hugo Grotius, trans. Charles Herbert, London, 1845, book 3, ch.24, pl.17, 
Grotius stated the position under Dutch (rather than Roman civil) law: ‘[t]he last insurer has 
the same proportion in profit and loss as the first’. The proposition is referable to various 
sixteenth-century ordinances, e.g.: ordinance of Phillippe II of 1563, title VII, article 2, in 
Pardessus, Collection, vol.4, 94; ordinance of Philippe II of 1570, article 13, ibid., 109; 
ordinance of Amsterdam of 31 Jan. 1598, article 23, ibid., 131. 
103
 Malynes’ Lex Mercatoria was cited during the Reading: e.g. Notes, 374, 375. 
104
 The practice (and law) would change later: the chronology of subscriptions would be 
disregarded; each underwriter would bear a share of the loss proportionate to their line. This is 
now the default rule in London: Marine Insurance Act 1906, s.67(2). In case of over-
subscription, it is now ‘a recognised and binding custom of the London marine and non-
marine markets that all lines are to be proportionately “written down” to 100 per cent upon 
the ultimate closing of the risk’: John Birds et al, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 13th ed., 
London, 2015, para.36-017. 
105
 Mentioned by Vincent in his repetition: Notes, 400. 
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that a policy on any kind of goods in any ship returning homeward from abroad should be 
treated as being ‘on account’.107 Vincent’s lecture would have constituted valuable guidance 
to common lawyers on this otherwise ambiguous point of construction and merchant practice. 
  
4. Presumption of loss in the absence of news 
In Vincent’s third hypothetical case, a merchant intended to depart on a trading voyage to 
Surat, India, in 1665. His creditors insured the merchant’s ship and his life, for the voyage out 
and back, for fear that if the voyage failed they would not be repaid. The policy was 
subscribed and the merchant sailed. Thereafter, no news was ever received of the merchant or 
of his ship. Thus, by the time of Vincent’s Reading, the merchant and ship had been missing 
for three or four years. The case raised the issue of whether, as a matter of law or practice, the 
merchant and ship could be presumed dead or lost, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                        
106
 Weskett, Complete Digest, 569 (title ‘Valuation’) no.10: ‘…it is not unusual to see a 
policy, completed with subscriptions to a large amount, on ship, freight, or goods, or on all of 
them, wherein has been inserted a clause that one or more of those interests conjointly or each 
respectively, as it may be, are and shall be “valued at …;” leaving the sums in blank: so that 
the assured has been at liberty, at any time afterwards, to fill up such blanks with such 
valuations, in figures, as he should find, according to events, might suit his own particular 
views of benefit; or according to the greater or less sums which have been insured on each 
interest or article respectively, or otherwise; and without applying for the consent of the 
insurers; who have entirely disregarded such blanks…’ 
107
 The African Company v Bull (1690) 1 Show. K.B. 132; African Comp: & Bull (1687, Hill. 
3-4 Jac. II) Harvard Law School (HLS) MS 4071, 73–74, accessible in J.H. Baker, ed., 
English Legal Manuscripts, Stage I [Microfiche], R 90 HLS MS 4071, vol.I, H-1776-mf.678–
680, 73–74.  
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Several participants argued against allowing any such presumption. Buroughs 
submitted that the Bigamy Act 1603,
108
 in providing that the death of one’s spouse should be 
presumed following their absence without tidings for seven years, indicated that there could 
be no such presumption at common law following any shorter period.
109
 Moreover, as the 
insurance policy covered a voyage out and back, with no ‘Circumscription of time’ by which 
the ship was to return, it would be inappropriate to apply a presumption of loss: there was no 
stipulated starting time from which the presumptive period could run. Finally, he warned that 
allowing an assured to rely on a presumption, instead of obliging him to prove his loss, would 
invite fraud. 
Luttrell added that the policy, construed contra proferentem, obliged the assured to 
adduce positive proof of their loss: ‘Every mans agreement is strongest against himselfe’.110 
Further, it would be arbitrary to presume that the merchant and ship had perished: as arbitrary 
as the presumption that if a man is ‘within the 4 seas’ when his wife gives birth, the child is 
his.
111
 
Burton rejected any reliance on merchant usage or practice, in this regard. While 
customs of the city of London, he argued, could be proven with certainty, and would bind, if 
‘Certifyed by the mouth of the recorder’ of London,112 the practices of merchant underwriters 
could not be so certified, and would not found a cause of action. 
Powell, Hooker and Vincent disagreed. Arguing from a common-law standpoint, 
Powell suggested that the lack of any fixed term for the voyage posed no difficulty: a 
                                                 
108
 1 Jac. I, c.11. 
109
 Notes, 394. 
110
 Ibid., 396. 
111
 Citing Co. Litt. 373a (Coke commenting that this presumption was irrebuttable). 
112
 Notes, 395. 
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provisional judgment could be entered for the assured,
113
 as was allowed in other types of 
actions.
114
 Moreover, the voyage to Surat could be made in thirteen months, so there was 
clearly scope for the court to exercise its discretion ‘accordant to the distans of places & 
parts’, and to infer that the vessel had foundered. Thus, ‘allowing [the possibility] of all 
Generall accidents’, the burden now lay on insurers to ‘prove the ship in being’.115 
Hooker argued on the basis of the law merchant, asserting that the ‘Custom of 
merchants’ prescribed a period of a year and a day without news, following which the assured 
was entitled to ‘renounce’, or abandon, the insured property to the underwriters and claim a 
total loss.
116
 This was subject to the assured providing security in case the ship reappeared.
117
 
The London insurance code of the 1580s, though not referred to,
118
 provided for similar 
presumptions: if there was no news of a ship for a year and a day, the assured could abandon 
the insured cargo and claim, subject to providing sureties; for voyages to the Indies, due to 
their longer expected duration, the presumptive period was two years without news.
119
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 Ibid., 394. 
114
 e.g. in an action in debt against an heir or executor, in a writ of mesne, or in a writ of 
warrantia chartæ, as discussed in the case cited by Powell: Brickhead v Archbishop of York 
(1616) Hob. 197, at 199 (where a writ of quare impedit was issued before the alleged refusal 
to admit). 
115
 Notes, 395. 
116
 Ibid., 396. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 See n.98 above. 
119
 Rossi, The London Code, 320–324, 394–396. There were similar presumptive rules in the 
Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See: Dave De ruysscher, ‘From 
Usages of Merchants to Default Rules: Practices of Trade, Ius Commune and Urban Law in 
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Equally, a presumption of death applied, in the case of insurance on the life of a debtor 
undertaking a long journey, where no news had been received for three years after the 
expiration of the policy.
120
 Hooker’s reference to a precise presumptive period is notable 
evidence of the survival of the ‘custom’, in London, in 1669. 
Vincent reinforced the point that it was legitimate to look to merchant usages and 
practices as a source of law, in such cases. They were binding, he explained, even if not part 
of ‘the Custom of London’: the practice of insurance took place ‘among merchants few 
whereof are free of the City’, yet ‘its agreed…by all the law of merchants is part of the law of 
the land’.121 Vincent illustrated this with two examples of merchant practices that the common 
                                                                                                                                                        
Early Modern Antwerp’, 33 Journal of Legal History (2012) 3, 13–14 (presumption 
applicable in Antwerp in 1544); ordinance of Philippe II of 1563, title VII, article 5 (rule 
applicable at the Borse of Antwerp, that insurer obliged to pay in the absence of news for a 
year and a day), in Pardessus, Collection, vol.4, 95–96; ordinance of Amsterdam of 31 Jan. 
1598, article 4 (presumption of loss if no news for a year and a day following the departure of 
a vessel for places in Europe, Barbary or neighbouring places; for places further away, the 
presumption to apply after two years), ibid., 124; Grotius, Inleidinge, book 3, ch.24, pl.10. 
Similarly, for France, see the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681, title ‘Assurances’, article 58, 
in René-Josué Valin, Nouveau Commentaire sur l’Ordonnance de la Marine Du Mois d’Août 
1681, 2 vols., La Rochelle, 1760, vol.2, 130–131.  
120
 Rossi, The London Code, 417–420. 
121
 Notes, 397. Vincent refers to 2 Inst. 58, where Coke comments on Magna Carta, c.30, 
providing for the freedom of alien merchants to travel and trade freely, ‘without any manner 
of evil tolts, by the old and rightful customs’: ‘That is, by auncient and right duties, due by 
auncient and lawfull custome, which hath been the auncient policy of the realme to encourage 
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law had recognized: the assignability by merchants of licences to import wine by parol,
122
 and 
the exclusion of survivorship between merchants trading for common profit.
123
 He also cited 
Vanheath v Turner,
124
 where it was stated that: ‘the custome of merchants is part of the 
common law of this kingdome, of which the Judges ought to take notice: and if any doubt 
arise to them about there custome, they may send for the merchants to know there custome, as 
they may send for the civillians to know there law...'
125
 Vincent re-emphasized that the judges 
were to ‘take notice’ of merchant ‘customs’ by ‘sending for merchants as they do for 
                                                                                                                                                        
merchants strangers, they have a speedy recovery for their debts and other duties, &c per 
legem mercator.; which is a part of the common law’. 
122
 Notes, 397, citing The King v Peter Richards (1542) 1 Dyer 54a, Exch. 
123
 Notes, 397, where the reference to ‘FNB’ was intended to refer to Fitzherbert’s Natura 
Brevium, i.e. Anthony Fitz-herbert, The New Natura Brevium…Corrected and Revised, 
London, 1666: probably to original page 117 pl.D–E (under heading ‘Writ of Account’), 
which deals with accounting and survivorship between merchants. Vincent also probably 
intended to refer to 1 Inst. 182 (not ‘82’, an error in the Notes). Vincent also cited 2 Inst. 404, 
where in commenting on the statute Westminster II, c.23, Coke noted that while at common 
law (prior to that statute) executors had no action of account, because ‘account rested in 
privity’, the rule was different for merchants: ‘per legem mercatoriam an action of account 
did lye for executors’. 
124
 (1621) Winch 24, CP, in which the merchant 'custome' permitting members of the same 
company to be ‘substituted’ for one another, as debtors to a bill of exchange subscribed by 
one of them, was considered. 
125
 Per Hobart CJCP. See also Anonymous (1668–69) Hardr. 485, Exch, at 486; Pickering v 
Barkley (1648) 2 Rolle Abr. 248, pl.10 (‘divers marchants fueront oie en Court pur le 
interpretation del parolls & le practise del Marchants en le Court del policie d’assurer…’ 
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Civilians’.126 He concluded that ‘this accions lyeth purely on the Custom’, which allowed the 
claim to be brought ‘before Certayne knowledge of any losse’.127  
Notably, Vincent also deployed policy arguments, grounded in the practical needs and 
realities of maritime commerce, to justify the presumption of loss. Any other solution, he 
stated, would be ‘perillous to all merchants that Ensure on long voyages’:128 this seems a 
cogent assertion, given the risk of financial ruin borne by merchants who engaged capital and 
credit in such voyages, if a return (or an indemnity) could not be guaranteed within a 
reasonable period of time.
129
 Moreover, merchants took care to record where ships were 
bound, and every ‘factory’, or overseas trading post, maintained correspondence with their 
merchant-principals in London, ‘wherfore if there be no news in a Competent time the 
presumption is stronger that the ship is Cast away by Hurrigan & no person saved’.130 Not to 
apply a presumption, and to require the assureds to prove the loss of their missing ships, 
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 Notes, 399. 
127
 Ibid., 397. See also ibid., 400–401: ‘the 3rd  Policy on account was grounded on the 
Custom of merchants who hold ship to be lost if she be not heard of in reasonable time Else 
none Could Come to have the benefit of their assurans’. 
128
 Ibid., 397–398. 
129
 As to the capital requirements, and risks, involved in overseas trade in the seventeenth 
century, see Richard Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-century England, 
Cambridge, 2002, 82–83, 91–98: ‘Providence was always on the lips of merchants, because 
fortunes gyrated wildly and bad luck could ruin the ablest and richest’; ‘Merchants had no 
control over unpredictable events and most were not cushioned by abundant resources against 
disasters’. 
130
 Notes, 398. Vincent conceded that this reasoning might not hold as firmly in relation to the 
life insurance, as ‘particular men’ might be saved without this being known: ibid., 399. 
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would in effect be ‘to give their mony away’.131 Thus, while at common law the assured 
would bear the burden of proof, or ‘the presumption of law’, in relation to their losses, 
‘among merchants’, ‘the Grave persons in the statute’, meaning the merchant-commissioners 
of the court of assurances, there were sound reasons for applying a presumption. Finally, 
Vincent observed, merchants insured to ‘prevent tryall by Jury’, by which he meant, 
presumably, to avoid the delays, formalities, expenses and uncertainties of common law 
trials
132
 by proceeding in the court of assurances. Accordingly, insureds ought to be 
indemnified quickly, against the provision of security, in accordance with merchant ‘custom’. 
Thus: ‘the rule and practice which is the law of the Court [of assurances] is Constantly thus 
on Great reason & a year & day after the place last heard on is Convenient time also…the 
persons ensured…must renounce his property to the Ensurors & give security to return the 
mony within a time’.133 
 
5. The court of assurances 
Throughout the Reading, Vincent’s audience heard arguments on the nature and jurisdiction 
of the court of assurances. The court arose from an arbitral tribunal established in the late 
sixteenth century under the auspices of the lord mayor of London.
134
 The 1601 Act gave 
statutory authority to an enlarged court of commissioners, to determine disputes between 
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 Ibid., 398. 
132
 See the preamble to the 1601 Act. 
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 Notes, 398. 
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 Rossi, The London Code, 75–88. Adrian Leonard, ‘The origins and development of 
London marine insurance, 1547–1824’, thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2013, 92–93, 104. 
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merchants arising from policies registered in the office of assurances in London. The aim of 
the Act was to strengthen English maritime commerce, by establishing a compulsory 
jurisdiction where assureds could obtain quick, summary determinations against all 
subscribers of a policy simultaneously, thereby ending the practice of some recalcitrant 
underwriters who had ‘soughte to drawe the parties assured to seeke their moneys of everie 
severall Assurer, by Suites commenced in her Majesties Courtes, to their greate charges and 
delayes…’135 
The court was composed of the admiralty judge, the recorder of London, two doctors 
of civil law, two common lawyers, and eight ‘grave and discrete Merchantes’, whose 
commissions were to be issued annually, if not more frequently, by the lord chancellor. The 
court was to meet in the office of assurances, in the Royal Exchange, in formations of at least 
five.
136
 By the 1601 and 1662 Acts, the court was given powers to imprison parties in 
contempt, to direct the examination of witnesses beyond the seas, to take evidence on oath, to 
pass sentences of execution against a party’s body or goods, and to award costs.  
The court of assurances has been described as having become, by 1657, a ‘landmark 
institution’ for London merchants, a convenient forum for all sorts of merchant disputes.137 
While active, it is said to have met weekly ‘at the Office of Assurances on the west side of the 
Royal Exchange’.138 Beyond this, details regarding the activities of the court in the 
seventeenth century, and of its fate, are obscure. The office of assurances and its records were 
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 1601 Act, preamble. 
136
 Post-1662 Act, of at least three. 
137
 Leonard, ‘London marine insurance’, 105–107. 
138
 Francis Boyer Relton, An Account of the Fire Insurance Companies Associations 
Institutions Projects and Schemes Established and Projected in Great Britain and Ireland 
during the 17th and 18th Centuries, London, 1893, 4. 
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apparently destroyed in the great fire of London in 1666.
139
 Sir Christopher Wren’s plans for 
rebuilding the city included a new building for the ‘Office for Insurance’, ‘to be situated at the 
[south-west] corner of his proposed Royal Exchange Square’, a building which was 
‘doubtless intended for the “Chamber of Insurance” or “Policies of Insurance Court”’.140 The 
1667 Act which legislated for the rebuilding of the city, indicates that in the meantime the 
activities of the office of assurances continued from Gresham House.
141
  
In 1676, Molloy noted what had by then become quite clear, that the 1601 and 1662 
Acts did not remove the jurisdiction of the courts of Westminster to hear actions on policies, 
but the court of assurances was given only ‘a concurrent Jurisdiction with those at the 
Common Law’.142 The last known evidence of any activity by the court of assurances arose 
when, in 1693, an assured sought prohibition against that court’s proceedings in the king’s 
bench.
143
 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Alexander Justice would observe: ‘As to 
what relates to Trials on Insurances, the Court of Admiralty has claim’d Jurisdiction in them; 
but all Causes of that Nature are now try’d in the Queen’s Bench and Common Pleas 
                                                 
139
 Ibid., 5. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Ibid., referring to 18 & 19 Car. II, c.8 (‘An Act for rebuilding the City of London’), 
s.XXVIII. 
142
 Molloy, De Jure Maritimo, 248 para.XVIII. At common law, an action could be brought 
on a policy based on ‘the Assumpsit’. The admiralty, Molloy noted, despite its efforts, had 
acquired no jurisdiction over insurance cases. 
143
 Delbye v Proudfoot (1693) 1 Show. KB 396; Leonard, ‘London marine insurance’, 110–
111. 
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Courts’;144 and, regarding the court of assurances, ‘now there is no such Court in being, but 
such Causes are tried in the ordinary Courts’.145 
In 1669, however, the court of assurances appears to have been a going concern. The 
nature and extent of its jurisdiction, and the encroachments on the latter by the courts of 
common law, were topics of real interest. The discussion at Vincent’s Reading touched on 
each of these topics.  
First, the jurisdiction of the court of assurances was explained. It extended only to 
what Molloy would refer to as ‘publique’ insurances,146 meaning policies ‘entred within the 
office of Assurances within the Citie of London’:147 though such policies might be made 
anywhere, at any time.
148
 The court’s jurisdiction was further restricted to policies made by 
merchants, for the insurance of their ‘Goodes Merchandizes Ships and Things adventured’.149 
This led to a question as to whether a policy made by a merchant’s factor, or by his creditors, 
would qualify: the reader thought it would.
150
 A further question was whether insurance on a 
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 Alexander Justice, A General Treatise of the Dominion of the Sea. And a Compleat Body 
of the Sea-Laws, 2nd ed., London, 1709, preface. 
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 Justice, Dominion of the Sea, 663. The demise of the court has been ascribed, broadly, to 
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Leonard, ‘London marine insurance’, 107, 111–113, 115, 138. 
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 Molloy, De Jure Maritimo, 240 para.II. 
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 Notes, 375 (Bennet); and see also 375 (Masters), 380 (Ellis), 382 (Vincent). 
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 Notes, 379 (Weston). 
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 1601 Act, preamble. 
150
 On the first case, Raymond argued that a policy concluded by a factor overseas was not 
concluded by a merchant (Notes, 376); cf. ibid., 380 (Ellis). On the third case, Buroughs 
argued that creditors were not ‘merchants’ (ibid., 394). Powell denied that either party before 
42 
 
life fell within the Act.
151
 On this point, Masters argued against any hard distinction between 
insurance on merchandise and on lives, for: ‘Spanish slaves of Giney are as goods which shall 
be answered’.152 Notwithstanding these restrictions, as an arbitral tribunal the court could rule 
on any dispute submitted to it voluntarily.
153
 In the absence of such consent, it was at best 
                                                                                                                                                        
the court had to be a merchant (ibid., 394), while Vincent contended that creditors had to be 
considered merchants (ibid., 397). Vincent’s argument recalls that accepted in relation to bills 
of exchange in Sarsfield v Witherly (1689) 1 Show. 125, 2 Vent. 292, Holt 112, Carth. 82, 
Comb. 45, 152. See James Steven Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes, 
Cambridge, 1995, 140. 
151
 Denoyr v Oyle (1649) Style 166, KB, was cited, in which prohibition was granted against 
proceedings in the court of assurances on a life insurance policy covering a ship’s captain for 
a voyage. On the first case, arguments favouring the jurisdiction of court over life insurance 
on a supercargo are at Notes, 374, 382–383 (Vincent), 376 (Masters), and 380 (Weston); cf. 
ibid., 375 (Bennet), and 381–382 (Ellis). On the third case, Powell argued that the court had 
jurisdiction over life insurance on a merchant (ibid., 395), as did Hooker (ibid., 396); cf. ibid., 
397 (Luttrell). 
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 Ibid., 376; and see also 396: ‘other things adventured Extends…to…the soul of a man’ 
(Luttrell). 
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 Ibid., 378 (Weston). Though James A. Jaffe, ‘Industrial Arbitration, Equity, and Authority 
in England, 1800–1850’ 18 Law & History Review (2000), 525, at 532 n.25, notes that in the 
eighteenth century, neither an arbitration clause in an insurance policy, nor an arbitral award, 
would prevent assureds from pursuing claims in common law courts, in parallel or 
subsequently. 
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arguable whether the court could exercise jurisdiction as of right over non-insurance questions 
incidental to an insurance dispute.
154
  
Second, the nature of proceedings in the court of assurances was described as ‘de 
plano’, plain and summary, without formal pleadings or jury, and proceeding by ‘examination 
as in the admiralty’.155 Notices of claims on policies, or ‘Intimations’, notices of abandonment 
of insured property, or ‘renunciations’, and past judgments of the court of assurances, were all 
kept in the office of assurances, and copies could be ‘easily had’.156 
Third, the jurisdiction of the court of assurances, it was clearly understood, did not 
exclude that of the common law courts. This was so even if the court of assurances had 
already finally determined a claim: for it was ‘but a Court of equity & a Bill in Chancery 
might as well be pleaded’ as the court’s sentences, in response to proceedings at common 
law.
157
 The common law courts had adopted the same attitude towards the court of assurances 
as they had towards the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts, granting prohibitions even after 
                                                 
154
 On the second case, arguing against the jurisdiction of the court over a dispute relating to a 
lease, were Holt (Notes, 386), Skipwith (ibid., 390), and Ayloffe (ibid., 389); cf. Tourner 
(ibid., 386–388) and Vincent (ibid., 392). 
155
 Ibid., 379 (Weston). 
156
 Ibid., 393 (Vincent). 
157
 Raymond (ibid., 377), citing Came v Moye (1658) 2 Sid. 121, KB, which held that the 
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the latter had delivered sentences.
158
 Indeed, the court of assurances was in a worse position 
than those other courts, for it had no exclusive jurisdiction, that of the common law courts 
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 Regarding the attitude of the common-law courts to the court of admiralty: George F. 
Steckley, ‘Merchants and the Admiralty Court During the English Revolution’, 22 American 
Journal of Legal History (1978), 137, at 143 n.14, 149; George F. Steckley, ‘Instance cases at 
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80–81; J.P. van Niekerk, ‘Marine Insurance Claims in the Admiralty Court: An Historical 
Conspectus’ 6 South African Mercantile Law Journal (1994), 26, 36–38, 44–45; Mallary v 
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ff., where Coke sets out the responses of ‘all the judges of England, and the barons of the 
exchequer’, to articles regarding abuses in the granting of prohibitions exhibited by the 
archbishop of Canterbury in 1605. See esp.: article 3 (prohibitions after defendant had 
pleaded, after sentence or execution); article 10 (prohibitions after several sentences); article 
12 (prohibitions because two witnesses not available); and article 19, complaining that 
prohibitions had prevented church courts from dealing with ‘every incident plea or matter 
alledged there in barre, or by way of exception, the principall cause being undoubtedly of 
ecclesiasticall cognizance’ (to which the judges responded, simply: ‘Matters incident that fall 
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having grown to include all insurance disputes. This was so even for policies concluded 
overseas. While in the sixteenth century, where a contract such as a policy of insurance was 
concluded and performed beyond the seas, no action would lie at common law: at least ‘the 
promise…which is the ground and foundation of the action’ had to be made within the 
realm.
159
 But by the seventeenth century the position had changed, in particular by the use of 
those fictional pleadings condemned so forcefully by Prynne,
160
 such that ‘at Common law 
whatever was done on land beyond sea may be layed here’.161 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the short duration of the tradition’s renaissance following the Restoration, there are 
good reasons not to neglect the latter-day readings. Vincent’s Reading suggests that, up to 
their very end, they remained a valuable forum for sharing sophisticated legal learning, which 
may otherwise have been difficult for English common lawyers to acquire.  
 As a corollary, where there are records of readings, such as Keble’s notebook, they 
may represent a generous source of concentrated evidence regarding the state of legal doctrine 
                                                                                                                                                        
out to be meere temporall, are to be dealt withall in the temporall, and not in the 
ecclesiasticall court’). See further R.H. Helmholz, The Oxford History of the Laws of 
England: The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s, Oxford, 
2004, 252, 303, 387–388, 398, 417. 
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 William Prynne, Brief animadversions on the fourth part of the Institutes, London, 1669, 
95–133.  
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 Notes, 381 (Ellis). There are many examples, e.g. Barton v Sadock (1611) 1 Bulstrode 103, 
KB, cited in argument during the Reading: ‘Barbary may here be laid to be in Kent, and so the 
same may well be tried…’ 
46 
 
on specific issues and areas of practice. Especially when considering the history of English 
law in the seventeenth century, a period marked by a general absence of practitioners’ 
treatises and by printed law reports of uneven quality, readings such as Vincent’s can be 
invaluable. This is particularly so in relation to early-modern statutes and early-modern 
phenomena, such as the 1601 Act and the ‘customs’, usages, practices and understandings 
relating to merchant assurances. The exposition of other post-Restoration readings—which 
are known to have addressed, amongst others, statutes such as 21 Hen. VIII, c.13 (clergy, 
leases to spiritual persons, plurality of benefits, etc.), 27 Hen. VIII, c.10 (of uses), 31 Hen. 
VIII, c.1 (joint tenants and tenants in common), 32 Hen. VIII, c.29 (mispleading, jeofails), 32 
Hen. VIII, c.34 (grantees of reversions), 27 Eliz. I, c.4 (covenous and fraudulent 
conveyances), 31 Eliz. I, c.6 (abuses in the election of scholars and presentations to 
benefices), 43 Eliz. I, c.4 (charitable uses), 3 Jac. I, c.4 (execution of statutes against 
recusants), 3 Car. I, c.1 (the Petition of Right), and 12 Car. II, c.13 (usury)
162—may serve to 
fill further gaps in the printed records of the seventeenth century. 
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